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Bien-Être Social, Inégalité et Privation 
Résumé 
Nous proposons une caractérisation du critère de satisfaction généralisée -- ou encore 
dans notre terminologie d'absence de privation -- introduit par S.R. Chakravarty 
(Keio Economic Studies 34 (1997), 17--32) pour effectuer des comparaisons de bien-
être. Nous montrons que le quasi-ordre de non-privation vérifie une version affaiblie 
du principe des transferts: le bien-être social augmente seulement suite à des 
combinaisons spécifiques de transferts progressifs, qui imposent aux individus 
contribuant au transfert d'être solidaires. Nous identifions la classe des fonctions de 
bien-être social de Gini généralisé qui obéissent à ce principe d'équité et nous 
montrons que l'unanimité des points de vue au sein de cette classe conduit au même 
classement des distributions que le quasi-ordre de non-privation. Nous étendons notre 
approche à la mesure de l'inégalité à partir des indices éthiques d'inégalité relatifs et 
absolus. 
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non-deprivation -- quasi-ordering introduced by S.R. Chakravarty (Keio Economic 
Studies 34 (1997), 17--32) for making welfare comparisons based on the absence of 
deprivation. We show that the non-deprivation quasi-ordering obeys a weaker 
version of the principle of transfers: welfare improves only for specific combinations 
of progressive transfers which require that the same amount be taken from richer 
individuals and allocated to one arbitrary poorer individual. We identify the 
subclass of extended Gini social welfare functions that are consistent with this 
principle and we show that the unanimity of value judgements among this class is 
identical to the ranking of distributions implied by the non-deprivation quasi-
ordering. We extend the approach to the measurement of inequality by considering 
the corresponding relative and absolute ethical inequality indices. 
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1. Introduction and Motivation
There is a widespread agreement in the literature to appeal to the generalised Lorenz dom-
inance criterion for making welfare comparisons across societies starting with their distri-
butions of income (see Kolm (1969), Shorrocks (1983)). Although the generalised Lorenz
quasi-ordering does only provide a partial ranking of the distributions under comparison, it
nevertheless constitutes a ﬁrst step in the appraisal of the distribution of well-being that can
later on be supplemented by the choice of particular indices in order to resolve the cases of
inconclusiveness. Much of the attractiveness of the generalised Lorenz criterion – beyond its
simplicity and elegance – stems from its association with the Pigou-Dalton condition. Accord-
ing to the latter any transfer from a richer individual to a poorer one that does not modify their
respective positions on the income scale – a so-called progressive transfer – reduces inequality,
and as long as total income is left unchanged also increases welfare. The generalised Lorenz
quasi-ordering and its variants have been extensively used in practice for making welfare and
inequality comparisons with a reasonable degree of success.
Notwithstanding its wide application in theoretical and empirical work, the generalised
Lorenz criterion is not the only possibility for passing welfare judgements. There is evidence
that the magnitude of the income received by an individual constitutes only part of the rele-
vant information for the assessment of her well-being. Individuals are not living in complete
isolation and they may be inclined to evaluate their life circumstances by comparison with
the situations of particular reference groups of individuals. The social status of an individual,
which we can assimilate in a ﬁrst round with her position in the social hierarchy, is consid-
ered an important dimension of one person’s self-assessment of her well-being (see e.g. Weiss
and Fershtman (1998)). Similarly feelings such as envy, resentment and satisfaction may con-
tribute to explain the way in which trends in well-being derived from subjective measures
diﬀer from those based on standard indicators focusing exclusively on the material dimensions
of well-being.1 In this respect, the notion of individual deprivation may be particularly useful
for understanding the way a person’s self-evaluation of her well-being departs from standard
monetary measures. Indeed, according to Runciman (1966), what matters for the individ-
ual’s own appraisal of well-being in a given situation is not what she gets, but rather how
much she feels deprived as compared to those individuals who, she considers, are treated more
favourably than she is.
The concept of deprivation has been echoed in the inequality and welfare literature even
though this has been done at the cost of an oversimpliﬁcation. In the economic literature
the level of deprivation experienced by any individual in a given situation is associated with
the average diﬀerence between her income and the incomes of the individuals richer than
her (see e.g. Yitzhaki (1979), Berrebi and Silber (1985), Hey and Lambert (1980), Ebert
and Moyes (2000), among others). If one believes that it is desirable to reduce deprivation,
then it is natural to declare that a distribution is better than another distribution if the
amount of deprivation experienced by each individual is less in the ﬁrst situation than in the
second. Credit has to be given to Kakwani (1984) for having made this idea precise through the
introduction of his [relative] deprivation quasi-ordering. According to the latter, deprivation in
a society decreases as the deprivation curve, which indicates the levels of deprivation attained
by all the individuals in the population, goes down. Kakwani (1984)’s suggestion has given
1 It is an important question from an ethical point of view to decide whether sentiments like envy and self-
contentment have to be counted when comparing diﬀerent social states. It is not the purpose of this paper
to address this issue, which raises important and diﬃcult philosophical questions.
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rise to a considerable literature aimed at reﬁning and extending the original deprivation quasi-
ordering. Particularly important for our purpose in this strand of research are the contributions
of Chakravarty (1997) and Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006).
One of the aims of Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006) is to uncover the implicit inequality
value judgements embedded in Kakwani (1984)’s deprivation quasi-ordering. Because their
focus is on inequality rather than on welfare, they restrict attention to income distributions
with the same mean. They identify the class of extended Gini social welfare functions that
are consistent with the absolute version of Kakwani (1984)’s deprivation quasi-ordering. In
addition they propose an alternative to the notion of a progressive transfer, which possesses the
property that, if a distribution is ranked above another by the deprivation quasi-ordering, then
the former can be derived from the latter by means of such transfers.2 A serious limitation
of this work from a practical point of view is the ﬁxed mean restriction, which prevents
welfare comparisons from being made in real world situations where the income distributions
typically diﬀer in size. Inspection of Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006, Proposition 5.3) suggests
however a simple method for deciding whether one distribution is welfare-superior to another
distribution. The test would consist in comparing the means and the deprivation curves of
the distributions under consideration: the distribution with the higher mean and the lowest
deprivation curve will be ranked above the other distribution by all the extended Gini welfare
functions they consider. The problem is that this procedure does not permit one to identify all
the cases where the application of unanimity among the relevant class of extended Gini welfare
functions is decisive. A criterion is missing, which would allow one to detect the distributions
which are ranked in the same way by all the extended Gini welfare functions.
On the contrary Chakravarty (1997) suggested a modiﬁcation of the deprivation curve
that permits welfare judgements to be made when the distributions under comparison have
unequal means. Building on a suggestion by Yitzhaki (1979) in a slightly diﬀerent framework,
Chakravarty (1997)’s proposal consists in taking the complement of a person’s deprivation
to mean income as a measure of her well-being. The so-called generalised satisfaction of an
individual constitutes the relevant information for making welfare comparisons. A distribu-
tion is considered better than another distribution if the generalised satisfaction curve, which
indicates the levels of satisfaction attained by all the individuals in the population, moves
upwards. Chakravarty (1997) considers a class of welfare functions, which has as special cases
the extended Gini welfare functions Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006) focused on. Therefore
the extent to which both approaches ﬁt together is not clear and this is an issue that needs
clariﬁcation. Furthermore the characterization of the generalised satisfaction quasi-ordering
provided by Chakravarty (1997) is not really illuminating. Admittedly it is shown that, if
one distribution is ranked above another by the generalised satisfaction quasi-ordering, then
the former can be obtained from the latter by means of a so-called fair transformation, and
conversely. However it is immediately clear that both statements are just two diﬀerent ways
of saying the same thing, which does not add a lot to our comprehension of the complex
equalising process leading to generalised satisfaction dominance.
Our paper aims at integrating the contributions of Chakravarty (1997) and Chateauneuf
and Moyes (2006) in a comprehensive and consistent model. We introduce the non-deprivation
quasi-ordering and we show that, if one distribution is ranked above another by this criterion,
2 They also investigate the properties of two alternative inequality quasi-orderings related to the class of
extended Gini social welfare functions. These criteria are not relevant for the present paper and we refer
the interested reader to the original contribution.
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then the dominating distribution can be obtained from the dominated one by successive appli-
cations of the equalising transformations considered by Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006) and/or
increments, and conversely. Because our non-deprivation quasi-ordering proves to be formally
identical to Chakravarty (1997)’s generalised satisfaction quasi-ordering, this result sheds light
upon the precise nature of the value judgements contained implicitly in the latter criterion.
We also demonstrate that the partial ordering implied by the non-deprivation quasi-ordering
coincides with the way all extended Gini social welfare functions – whose weighting functions
are non-decreasing and star-shaped – rank the distributions. This result extends to all mono-
tone social welfare functions that attach a positive value to decreases in deprivation, which
is actually the case considered by Chakravarty (1997). The non-deprivation – equivalently
the generalised satisfaction – quasi-ordering is operationally more eﬃcient than the two-step
procedure based on comparisons of mean incomes and deprivation curves, and it has to be
substituted for the latter. Previous work does not make clear the relationship between the gen-
eralised satisfaction curve and the quantile function. We show that the non-deprivation curve
is but a modiﬁed version of the quantile curve where successive ﬁrst diﬀerences in incomes are
given decreasing weights.
We present in Section 2 our conceptual framework and we introduce the notions of social
welfare functions and inequality indices that will be subsequently used. Section 3 is con-
cerned with the standard approach to welfare and inequality measurement which builds on
the principle of transfers. We recall the standard criteria of rank order dominance, generalised
Lorenz dominance, relative and absolute Lorenz dominance and we present without proofs
the well-known equivalences between these quasi-orderings, the underlying transformations
of the distributions and the corresponding classes of welfare and inequality measures. Our
main contribution is contained in Section 4, where we introduce the welfare and inequality
dominance criteria that build upon the extent to which every individual feels deprived. We
weaken the principle of transfers by imposing restrictions on the way the progressive trans-
fers are combined. Next we introduce the non-deprivation quasi-ordering and we show that
it is equivalent to the unanimous ranking generated by all the extended Gini social welfare
functions that are consistent with our restricted principle of transfers. Appropriate normalisa-
tions of the distributions allow us to derive the corresponding relative and absolute inequality
quasi-orderings. As we have insisted above our approach builds on some existing work and we
therefore devote Section 5 to a discussion and clariﬁcation of the relationships between our
contribution and related work in the literature. In particular we contrast our model with the
contributions of Chakravarty (1997), Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006), and Hey and Lambert
(1980). Our approach is illustrated in Section 6 where the non-deprivation dominance criteria
are used in order to compare the distributions of income in 17 countries from the welfare and
inequality point of view. Finally we summarize our results in Section 7, which also hints at
some directions for future research.
2. Notation and Preliminary Deﬁnitions
We assume throughout that incomes are drawn from an interval D of R. An income distribution
– or equivalently, a situation – for a population consisting of n identical individuals (n ≥ 2) is a
list x := (x1,x2,...,xn) where xi ∈ D is the income of individual i. We suppose that incomes
are arranged non-decreasingly and we use Yn(D) to represent the set of income distributions.
The arithmetic mean of distribution x ∈ Yn(D) is indicated by µ(x) :=
Pn
i=1 xi/n. We denote
as F(·;x) the cumulative distribution function of x ∈ Yn(D) deﬁned by F(z;x) := m(z;x)/n,
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for all z ∈ (−∞,+∞), where m(z;x) := #{i ∈ {1,2,...,n}|xi ≤ z}. We let F −1(·;x)
represent the inverse cumulative distribution function – or equivalently, the quantile function






 F(z;x) ≥ p
o
, ∀p ∈ (0,1]
(see Gastwirth (1971)). The restrictions that the population size is ﬁxed and that incomes are
non-decreasingly arranged can be easily dispensed with by invoking respectively the principle
of population (see Dalton (1920)) and the condition of symmetry.3 Indeed, all the welfare
and inequality measures – indices and quasi-orderings – considered later on satisfy these two
conditions.
A social welfare function is a continuous mapping W : Yn(D) −→ R such that W(x)
measures the welfare of society in situation x ∈ Yn(D). We denote as W the set of social
welfare functions and we take the traditional view that W(x) represents the social welfare
in situation x as it is conceived by an ethical observer on the basis of the information about
the individuals’ personal circumstances she has access to. Similarly, an inequality index is a
continuous mapping I : Yn(D) −→ R such that I(x) represents the degree of inequality in
situation x ∈ Yn(D) and we denote as I the set of inequality indices. We restrict attention to
ethical inequality indices, namely those indices that are derived from a social welfare function.
According to the ethical approach, inequality is measured by the amount of income that would
have been saved if equality had prevailed and social welfare had been the same as in the current
situation (see Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (1999) for a survey of the literature). Given
the social welfare function W we denote as Ξ(x) the equally distributed equivalent income of
distribution x ∈ Yn(D) deﬁned by
(2.2) W(x) = W (x1,...,xn) = W (Ξ(x),...,Ξ(x)).
The equally distributed equivalent income is uniquely deﬁned provided that the social welfare
function is increasing along the ray of equality. The social evaluation function Ξ and the social
welfare function W are ordinally equivalent in the sense that
(2.3) ∀x,y ∈ Yn(D) : W(x) ≥ W(y) ⇐⇒ Ξ(x) ≥ Ξ(y).
Starting with a given social welfare function, we may consider two types of inequality indices
depending on the way we measure the income loss. The relative inequality index represents the
proportion of total income that is wasted due to the presence of unequal incomes. Precisely
it is deﬁned by
(2.4) I
R(x) := 1 −
Ξ(x)
µ(x)
, ∀ x ∈ Yn(D) (D ⊆ R++).
The absolute inequality index represents the income that would have been saved if equality
had prevailed and it is written
(2.5) I
A(x) := µ(x) − Ξ(x), ∀ x ∈ Yn(D).
The literature has mainly focused on two general families of social welfare functions up to
now. The utilitarian approach assumes that social welfare is simply the sum of the utilities
3 The principle of population and the condition of symmetry require respectively that welfare and inequality
do not change when the distributions are replicated and when incomes are permuted among the individuals.
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u(xi), ∀ x ∈ Yn(D),
where u ∈ U := {u : D −→ R |u is continuous} is the utility function deﬁned up to an
increasing and aﬃne transformation. According to the second approach – the extended Gini













xi, ∀ x ∈ Yn(D),
where f ∈ F := {f : [0,1] −→ [0,1] |f is continuous,f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1} is the weight-
ing function (see Weymark (1981), Yaari (1987, 1988), Ebert (1988)). The utility function
and the weighting function capture the preferences of the ethical observer within the utili-
tarian and extended Gini models, respectively. The two former models are actually special
cases of the rank-dependent expected utility model popularized by Quiggin (1993)4 We indi-
cate respectively by IR
u and IA
u the relative and absolute inequality indices derived from the
utilitarian social welfare function (2.6) when the ethical observer’s preferences are captured
by the utility function u. Similarly, the relative and absolute inequality indices corresponding
to the extended Gini social welfare function (2.7) are denoted by IR
f and IA
f , respectively.
3. Lorenz Consistent Welfare and Inequality Measures
3.1. The Measurement of Social Welfare
Following the practice in the dominance literature we examine successively the case where the
ethical observer is only concerned with eﬃciency and the case where equity considerations are
also taken into account.
Definition 3.1. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D), we will say that x is obtained
from y by means of an increment if there exist ∆ > 0 and an individual i such that
(3.1) xi = yi + ∆ and xh = yh, ∀h 6= i.
It is usually considered that an increase in someone’s income other things equal results in a
social welfare improvement, hence the following condition:
Monotonicity [MON]. For all x,y ∈ Yn(D), we have W(x) ≥ W(y) whenever x is obtained
from y by means of an increment.
We indicate by W 1 the set of social welfare functions that satisfy MON. One easily checks that
the non-decreasingness of u and f, respectively, ensure that the utilitarian and the extended
Gini social welfare functions satisfy the above condition. We denote respectively as
U
1 := {u ∈ U | u is non-decreasing} and (3.2)
F
1 := {f ∈ F | f is non-decreasing} (3.3)
the corresponding classes of utility and weighting functions. It is convenient for later use to
introduce the following criterion:
4 Actually a characterization of the so-called rank-dependent expected utility model is provided in Ebert
(1988), where emphasis is on inequality measurement rather than on choice under uncertainty.
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Definition 3.2. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D), we will say that x rank order













, ∀k = 1,2,...,n,
where RO(p;x) := F −1(p;x), for all p ∈ [0,1]. The result below summarizes the existing
results in the literature when one pays attention to eﬃciency considerations exclusively.
Theorem 3.1. Let x,y ∈ Yn(D). The following ﬁve statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a ﬁnite sequence of increments.
(b) W(x) ≥ W(y), for all W ∈ W 1.
(b1) Wu(x) ≥ Wu(y), for all u ∈ U 1.
(b2) Wf(x) ≥ Wf(y), for all f ∈ F 1.
(c) x ≥RO y.
Among other things Theorem 3.1 indicates the restrictions that have to be placed on the utility
and the weighting functions for the utilitarian and the extended Gini social welfare functions
to be consistent with the rank order quasi-ordering.
It is typically assumed in normative economics that inequality is reduced and welfare
increased by a transfer of income from a richer individual to a poorer individual.
Definition 3.3. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D), we will say that x is obtained
from y by means of a progressive transfer, if there exists an income amount ∆ > 0 and two
individuals i,j such that
xh = yh, ∀ h 6= i,j; (3.5a)
xi = yi + ∆; xj = yj − ∆; and (3.5b)
∆ ≤ (yj − yi)/2. (3.5c)
We note that, according to our deﬁnition, a progressive transfer does not reverse the relative
positions of all the individuals in the society.
Principle of Transfers [PT]. For all x,y ∈ Yn(D), we have W(x) ≥ W(y) and I(x) ≤
I(y) whenever x is obtained from y by means of a progressive transfer.
We let W 2 represent the set of social welfare functions that satisfy MON and PT. It is a
straightforward exercise to check that the concavity of u and the convexity of f, respectively,
guarantee that the utilitarian and the extended Gini social welfare functions obey PT. We
denote as
U
2 := {u ∈ U | u is non-decreasing and concave} and (3.6)
F
2 := {f ∈ F | f is non-decreasing and convex} (3.7)
the corresponding classes of utility and weighting functions. The generalised Lorenz curve of
distribution x ∈ Yn(D) is deﬁned by
(3.8) GL(p;x) :=

    
    







np − j + 1
n








where k = 2,3,...,n (see Shorrocks (1983), Moyes (1999)).
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Definition 3.4. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D), we will say that x generalised













, ∀k = 1,2,...,n.
It has long been recognized that the notion of progressive transfer is closely associated with
the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering as the following result demonstrates (see Kolm (1969),
Marshall and Olkin (1979), Sen (1973), Shorrocks (1983), Foster (1985), among others):
Theorem 3.2. Let x,y ∈ Yn(D). The following ﬁve statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a ﬁnite sequence of increments and/or progressive
transfers.
(b) W(x) ≥ W(y), for all W ∈ W 2.
(b1) Wu(x) ≥ Wu(y), for all u ∈ U 2.
(b2) Wf(x) ≥ Wf(y), for all f ∈ F 2.
(c) x ≥GL y.
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that both the utilitarian and the extended Gini social wel-
fare functions are consistent with the rank order and the generalised Lorenz quasi-orderings
provided that appropriate restrictions be placed on the utility and the weighting functions.
More importantly, they stress that the rankings of distributions generated by the utilitarian
and the extended Gini models under the constraint of unanimity among the classes of utility
and weighting functions are identical.5 As we will see later on, this is not necessarily true
when criteria diﬀerent from the rank order and the generalised Lorenz quasi-orderings are
considered.
3.2. The Measurement of Inequality
The preceding approach generalises in a straightforward way to inequality measurement by
appropriate normalisations of the distributions under comparison (see e.g. Moyes (1999)).
Definition 3.5. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D) with D ⊆ R++, we will say
that x is obtained from y by means of a scale transformation if there exists λ > 0 such that
xi = λyi, for all i = 1,2,...,n.
Scale Invariance [SI]. For all x,y ∈ Yn(D) with D ⊆ R++, we have I(x) = I(y) whenever
x is obtained from y by means of a scale transformation.
We let I 2 and I R represent the set of inequality indices that satisfy conditions PT and SI,
respectively. It is a straightforward exercise to check that the convexity of f guarantees that
IR
f ∈ I 2 ∩ I R. The relative Lorenz curve of distribution x ∈ Yn(D) with D ⊆ R++ is
deﬁned by RL(p;x) := GL(p;ˆ x), for all p ∈ [0,1], where ˆ x := (ˆ x1,..., ˆ xn) is the reduced
distribution corresponding to x with ˆ xi := xi/µ(x), for all i = 1,2,...,n.
Definition 3.6. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D) with D ⊆ R++, we will say













, ∀k = 1,2,...,(n − 1).
5 This follows from the fact that the stochastic dominance and the inverse stochastic dominance quasi-orderings
coincide up to the second order.
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The following result establishes the connections between relative Lorenz dominance, progres-
sive transfers and scale transformations, and the requirement of unanimity among the ethical
observers – in particular the extended Gini ones – who subscribe to PT and SI.
Theorem 3.3. 6 Let x,y ∈ Yn(D) with D ⊆ R++. The following four statements are equiv-
alent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a scale transformation and/or a ﬁnite sequence of
progressive transfers.
(b) I(x) ≤ I(y), for all I ∈ I 2 ∩ I R.
(b2) IR
f (x) ≤ IR
f (y), for all f ∈ F 2.
(c) x ≥RL y.
Definition 3.7. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D), we will say that x is obtained
from y by means of a translation transformation if there exists γ ∈ R such that xi = yi + γ,
for all i = 1,2,...,n.
Translation Invariance [TI]. For all x,y ∈ Yn(D), we have I(x) = I(y) whenever x is
obtained from y by means of a translation transformation.
We let I A represent the set of inequality indices that satisfy condition TI. It is easy to
verify that the convexity of f guarantees that IA
f ∈ I 2 ∩ I A. The absolute Lorenz curve
of distribution x ∈ Yn(D) is deﬁned by AL(p;x) := GL(p;˜ x), for all p ∈ [0,1], where
˜ x := (˜ x1,..., ˜ xn) is the centered distribution corresponding to x with ˜ xi := xi − µ(x), for all
i = 1,2,...,n (see Moyes (1987)).
Definition 3.8. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D), we will say that x absolute













, ∀k = 1,2,...,(n − 1).
The following result establishes the connections between absolute Lorenz dominance, progres-
sive transfers and translation increments, and the requirement of unanimity among the ethical
observers – were they of the extended Gini type or not – who subscribe to PT and TI.
Theorem 3.4. Let x,y ∈ Yn(D). The following four statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a translation transformation and/or a ﬁnite sequence
of progressive transfers.
(b) I(x) ≤ I(y), for all I ∈ I 2 ∩ I A.
(b2) IA
f (x) ≤ IA
f (y), for all f ∈ F 2.
(c) x ≥AL y.
6 It is important to note that there is no statement analogue to statement (b2) concerning the inequality indices
one derives from the utilitarian model. This originates in the fact that the unanimous agreement among all
utilitarian ethical observers endowed with an Atkinson-Kolm-Sen utility function does not generally imply
relative Lorenz dominance.
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4. Social Welfare and Inequality as the Absence of Deprivation
4.1. The Measurement of Social Welfare
Among the criteria that have been proposed in addition to the generalised Lorenz quasi-
ordering the deprivation quasi-ordering is certainly the most well-known. It builds on the idea
introduced in sociology by Runciman (1966) according to which a person feels deprived if she
realizes that some other persons enjoy some item – for instance social status – she does not
have access to but sees no reason why she is not entitled to get it.7 The greater the magnitude
of the perceived diﬀerences between her social status and those of the persons she compares
herself with, the more acute her feeling of deprivation will be. Assimilating the social status
of any individual with her income, Kakwani (1984) has proposed to use the deprivation curve
for comparing income distributions. For reasons that will become obvious later on, we depart
slightly from Kakwani’s suggestion and we introduce the non-deprivation curve of distribution
x ∈ Yn(D) deﬁned by
(4.1) ND(p;x) :=

    
    
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where k = 2,3,...,n. We interpret ND(k/n;x) as a measure of the feeling of non-deprivation
of individual with rank p = k/n in situation x. In order to make the meaning of ND(p;x)
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is the censored distribution obtained from x by letting xk
i := xi, for
all i = 1,2,...,k, and xk
i := xk, for all i = k + 1,k + 2,...,n. Manipulating (4.2) one step


































7 The notion of individual deprivation comprises two dimensions: the ﬁrst one is related to envy because
another person has something I would like to have, while the second one stresses the injustice I feel in this
situation. While there is a consensus for taking into account feelings of injustice when evaluating a person’s
well-being, counting for sentiments like envy or jealousy is debatable. We will not enter into this debate and
we will limit ourselves with the examination of the consequences for welfare measurement of using individual
deprivation as the prime information.













[xj − xk], ∀k = 1,2,...,n,
is a measure of the absolute deprivation of individual k in situation x (see Ebert and Moyes
(2000), Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006)). Therefore, the non-deprivation of person k is identical
to the diﬀerence between the mean income and her absolute deprivation: this is actually
nothing else than what Chakravarty (1997) called person’s k generalised satisfaction.8
Deﬁnition (4.1) makes clear that the non-deprivation curve is a step function with jumps
















[xk+1 − xk] ≥ 0, ∀k = 1,2,...,n − 1,
for all x ∈ Yn(D), which establishes that the non-deprivation curve is non-decreasing in
p ∈ [0,1]. Like the quantile curve, the non-deprivation curve attains its minimum value equal
to F −1(0;x) = x1 when p = 0. Like the generalised Lorenz curve, it reaches its maximum
value equal to mean income µ(x) when p = 1. We have represented in Figure 4.1 the rank
order, the non-deprivation and the generalised Lorenz curves of distribution y := (1,5,6,10).
One observes that the non-deprivation curve lies above the generalised Lorenz curve and below
the rank order curve. Deﬁnition (4.1) also draws attention to the connection with the inverse
distribution function. Indeed notice that in our framework where distributions are discrete




    
    














where k = 2,3,...,n. Comparing (4.1) and (4.6) one notices that the quantile and the non-
deprivation curves only diﬀer in the way the adjacent pairwise income diﬀerences are weighted.
In the case of the quantile curve the ﬁrst diﬀerences in incomes are all given the same weight
equal to unity, while in the case of the non-deprivation curve the weights are decreasing at
a constant rate. The impact of the weighting scheme on the shape of the quantile and non-
deprivation curves is well reﬂected in Figure 4.1.
We follow Chakravarty (1997) and compare income distributions on the basis of the non-
deprivation curves they generate. More precisely we have:
Definition 4.1. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D), we will say that x non-













, ∀k = 1,2,...,n.
A distribution will be considered to be superior to another from a welfare point of view
if the non-deprivation experienced by any individual is not smaller in the ﬁrst distribution
8 We avoid here the term of satisfaction because it has been already used in Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006)
with a diﬀerent meaning.
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than in the second distribution. An immediate question is to know how the non-deprivation
quasi-ordering behaves in comparison with the rank order and the generalised Lorenz quasi-
orderings. Chakravarty, Chattopadhyay, and Majumder (1995, Theorem 1) have shown that
non-deprivation dominance implies generalised Lorenz dominance when the distributions under
comparison have equal means. The following result dispenses with the equal mean restriction:
Proposition 4.1. (a) If n = 2, then ≥RO ⊂ ≥ND = ≥GL. (b) If n > 2, then ≥RO ⊂ ≥ND ⊂
≥GL.
Proof. Because statement (a) is obvious, we only prove statement (b). It follows imme-
diately from (4.2) that, if xk ≥ yk, for all k = 1,2,...,n, then x ≥ND y. To establish
that x ≥ND y implies x ≥GL y, it suﬃces to show that ND(k/n;x) ≥ ND(k/n;y) implies
GL(k/n;x) ≥ GL(k/n;y), for all k = 1,2,...,n. Clearly, the implication is true for k = 1.
We argue by induction and verify that, if it is true for k, then so it is for k +1. Suppose that

















n − k − 1
n
yk+1.
If xk+1 > yk+1, then the result follows from the fact that, by assumption, GL(k/n;x) ≥














n − k − 1
n
[xk+1 − yk+1] ≥ 0.
Finally, consider distributions x = (1,4,8,9), y = (1,5,6,10) and z = (1,4,7,10). One can
easily verify that x ≥ND z but ¬[x ≥RO z], and that y ≥GL z but ¬[y ≥ND z], which conﬁrms
that the inclusions in statement (b) are strict.
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The non-deprivation quasi-ordering may therefore be considered an intermediate criterion
halfway between the rank order and the generalised Lorenz quasi-orderings. As a result the
non-deprivation criterion will provide a more partial – or to the best no more complete –
ranking of the distributions under comparison than the one implied by the generalised Lorenz
quasi-ordering. From a practical point of view, this may be considered a weakness of the
non-deprivation quasi-ordering as compared with the generalised Lorenz one. As we will show
below the non-deprivation quasi-ordering relies on value judgements that are less demanding
– and hopefully more likely to be accepted – than the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering. The
loss in the discriminatory power of the non-deprivation quasi-ordering is the price to pay for its
ability to reach a larger consensus. On the other hand, the extent of the loss in the conclusive
rankings one experiences, when the non-deprivation criterion is substituted for the generalised
Lorenz quasi-ordering, is ultimately an empirical matter.
There is evidence that the principle of transfers, that supports the generalised Lorenz
criterion, is far from being unanimously accepted, as a number of experimental studies have
demonstrated (see Amiel and Cowell (1992, 1999), Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo (1993), Harrison
and Seidl (1994), Gaertner and Namezie (2003), among others). However, none of these studies
provides information about the subjects’ ethical preferences – with the exception that these
preferences are at variance with the views captured by the principle of transfers – that might
explain such a rejection. Nor do they propose alternatives to the principle of transfers that
might be more in line with the subjects’ attitudes towards inequality. Here we propose to
weaken the principle of transfers by imposing a degree of solidarity among the individuals
who take part in the redistribution process. However, solidarity is restricted to the individuals
who give away a fraction of their incomes: if some income is taken from a rich individual,
then in order for there to be solidarity, the same amount is taken from every individual who
is as rich or richer than this individual. But it is not necessary that the individuals who
are poorer than the transfer recipient beneﬁt also from an equal additional income.9 By
contrast, a progressive transfer imposes no solidarity at all among the individuals involved
in the equalising transformation. It follows that the relative positions of the donors and
beneﬁciaries of the transfers on the income scale will play a crucial role in the deﬁnition of our
inequality reducing transformation. We emphasize that the idea of introducing the positions
of the individuals for assessing the impact of a transfer is not new in the literature. Such an
idea is at the heart of the notion of a positional composite transfer proposed by Chateauneuf
and Wilthien (1999) and Zoli (2002) for instance.10
Definition 4.2. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D), we will say that x is obtained
from y by means of a uniform on the right progressive transfer if there exists an income amount
∆ > 0 and two individuals h,k (1 ≤ h < k ≤ n) such that:
xi = yi, ∀ i ∈ {1,...,h − 1} ∪ {h + 1,...,k − 1}; (4.10a)
xh = yh + ∆; (4.10b)
xi = yi −
∆
n − k + 1
, ∀ i ∈ {k,...,n}. (4.10c)
9 One may conceive of other ways of introducing solidarity among the givers and receivers, which result in
diﬀerent possible equalising transformations (see Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006)).
10The notion of a positional composite transfer generalises a suggestion of Kakwani (1980) that constitutes
an alternative to the principle of diminishing transfers due to Kolm (1976).
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If k = n, then a uniform on the right progressive transfer reduces to a usual progressive
transfer, and this is actually the only case where both types of transformations coincide.
Although in general uniform on the right progressive transfers and progressive transfers are
diﬀerent operations, the former can always be decomposed into a ﬁnite sequence of the latter,
as the next result demonstrates.
Proposition 4.2. Let x,y ∈ Yn(D) and suppose that x is obtained from y by means of a
single uniform on the right progressive transfer. Then x can be obtained from y by means of
a ﬁnite sequence of progressive transfers.
Proof. Suppose that x is obtained from y by means of a uniform on the right progressive
transfer so that there exists ∆ > 0 and two individuals h,k (1 ≤ h < k ≤ n) such that
conditions (4.10a), (4.10b) and (4.10c) hold. Consider the distribution z(1) deﬁned by
z
(1)
i = yi = xi, ∀ i = 1,2,...,h − 1, (4.11a)
z
(1)
h = yh +  < xh; (4.11b)
z
(1)
i = yi = xi, ∀ i = h + 1,...,k − 1, (4.11c)
z
(1)
k = yk −  = xk, (4.11d)
z
(1)
i = yi < xi, ∀ i = k + 1,k + 2,...,n, (4.11e)
where  = ∆/(n − k + 1). By construction we have
(4.12) z
(1)












k+1 ≤ ··· ≤ z
(1)
n .
Therefore z(1) is obtained from y by means of a progressive transfer that does not modify the


























i < xi, ∀ i = k + 2,k + 3,...,n. (4.13e)
Distribution z(2) is obtained from z(1) by means of a rank preserving progressive transfer.
Repeating this operation with j = k + 2,k + 3,...,n we ﬁnally obtain distribution x in
n − k + 1 steps, where each step involves a single rank preserving progressive transfer. Thus
the uniform on the right progressive transfer has been decomposed into n − k + 1 progressive
transfers of an amount  = ∆/(n − k + 1) as it is indicated in Table 4.1.
It follows from Proposition 4.2 that, if a distribution is obtained from another by means of
a uniform on the right progressive transfer, then the former will generalised Lorenz dominate
the latter. But the fact that one distribution is ranked above another by the generalised Lorenz
criterion does not imply that the former can be obtained from the latter by means of a sequence
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Table 4.1: Decomposition of a Uniform on the Right Progressive Transfer
z(1) z(2) z(3) ··· z(n−2) z(n−1) z(n)








h − 1 0 0 0 ··· 0 0 0
h + + + ··· + + +








k − 1 0 0 0 ··· 0 0 0
k − 0 0 ··· 0 0 0








n − 1 0 0 0 ··· 0 − 0
n 0 0 0 ··· 0 0 −
of uniform on the right progressive transfers. Choose x = (1,4,4,7) and y = (1,3,5,7): clearly
x ≥GL y but it is impossible to transform y into x by means of uniform on the right progressive
transfers. We ﬁnd convenient at this stage to introduce an intermediate result that will prove
useful later on.
Proposition 4.3. Let x,y ∈ Yn(D). Then x ≥ND y whenever x is obtained from y by means
of a uniform on the right progressive transfer.
Proof. Suppose that x is obtained from y by means of a uniform on the right progressive
transfer so that there exists ∆ > 0 and two individuals h,k (1 ≤ h < k ≤ n) such that













           
           
0, 1 ≤ i < h,
(n − h + 1)∆
n
> 0, i = h,
∆
n
> 0, h < i < k,
0, k ≤ i ≤ n,
hence x ≥ND y.
The following condition, which requires that social welfare does not decrease as the result
of a uniform on the right progressive transfer, constitutes a weakening of the usual principle
of transfers.
Uniform of the Right Principle of Transfers [URPT]. For all x,y ∈ Yn(D), we have
W(x) ≥ W(y) and I(x) ≤ I(y) whenever x is obtained from y by means of a uniform on the
right progressive transfer.
We indicate by W ∗ the set of social welfare functions that satisfy MON and URPT and
note that W 2 ⊂ W ∗, which actually ensures that the class W ∗ is non-empty. For instance the
social welfare function W(x) := H(ND(x)), where ND(x) := (ND(1/n;x),...,ND(n/n;x))
is the non-deprivation proﬁle generated by distribution x, veriﬁes URPT provided that H be
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symmetric and monotone.11 This social welfare function imposes a particular factorization
process and one might be willing to consider more conventional social welfare functions such
as the utilitarian and extended Gini.
It is argued in Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006) that the utilitarian principle does not permit
one to distinguish between the ethical observers who subscribe to the uniform on the right
principle of transfers from those who agree with the principle of transfers.12 By contrast the
extended Gini approach makes it possible to identify the ethical observers who share the views
reﬂected by either principle. Before we examine the implications of imposing consistency with
the uniform on the right principle of transfers, we have to introduce additional technicalities.




is non-decreasing in q, ∀ q ∈ (0,1].
It is well-known that convexity of f ∈ F is both necessary and suﬃcient for welfare to increase
as the result of a progressive transfer when the former is evaluated by means of the extended
Gini social welfare function (see e.g. Chateauneuf and Moyes (2004, Proposition 4.4)). We
show below that it is possible to ﬁnd a similar justiﬁcation for the star-shapedness property
provided one is willing to consider the impact on social welfare of particular combinations of
increments.
Definition 4.3. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D), we will say that x is obtained
from y by means of a k-uniform on the right increment if there exists ∆ > 0 such that
xi = yi, ∀i = 1,2,...,k − 1, and (4.16a)
xi = yi +
∆
n − k + 1
, ∀i = k,k + 1,...,n. (4.16b)
Clearly a k-uniform on the right increment results in a social welfare improvement in the
extended Gini model provided that the weighting function f is increasing. Consider now an
arbitrary distribution y and let x(1) and x(2) be two distributions such that x(1) is obtained
from y by means of a k-uniform on the right increment equal to ∆ > 0 while a (k + 1)-
uniform on the right increment of the same amount transforms y into x(2). Computing the






− Wf (y) = f
 































− Wf (y): the
lower is k, the greater the welfare improvement caused by a k uniform on the right increment
of a given amount ∆ > 0. Observe further that, by construction, distributions x(1) and x(2)
are such that x(1) is derived from x(2) by means of a uniform on the right progressive transfer
11There is no need to impose that the aggregation function H be Schur-concave as it is done in Chakravarty
and Mukherjee (1999) for social welfare as measured by H(ND(x)) to increase as a result of an arbitrary
uniform on the right progressive transfer.
12More precisely, concavity of the utility function is shown to be a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the
utilitarian social welfare function to satisfy the uniform on the right principle of transfers.
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of the amount ∆/(n − k + 1) > 0 from the individuals no poorer than k +1 to the individual


































Table 4.2, where the ﬁrst row refers to the positions of the individuals on the income scale
generated by distribution y, makes the construction of distributions x(1) and x(2) more trans-
parent. The above argument generalises to an arbitrary uniform on the right progressive
transfer by choosing appropriately the h-uniform on the right and k-uniform on the right in-
crements so that h < k. Therefore a suﬃcient condition for a uniform on the right progressive
transfer to improve social welfare as measured by the extended Gini welfare function is that
the weighting function f is star-shaped.13 Convexity is stronger than star-shapedness: the
former requirement implies the latter but the converse implication is false. This is illustrated
in Figure 4.2 where we have represented two diﬀerent weighting functions: f is star-shaped
but not convex while g is convex and thus star-shaped. For later reference we denote as F ∗
the set of weighting functions f ∈ F that are non-decreasing and star-shaped.
Table 4.2: Construction of Distributions x(1), x(2) and x(3)
1 ··· k − 1 k k + 1 ··· n
x(1) − y 0 ··· 0
+∆
n − k + 1
+∆
n − k + 1
···
+∆
n − k + 1






x(1) − x(2) 0 ··· 0
+∆
n − k + 1
−∆
(n − k)(n − k + 1)
···
−∆
(n − k)(n − k + 1)
We are now in a position to state the announced result, which establishes the connec-
tions between increments and uniform on the right progressive transfers, unanimity of value
judgements among the ethical observers who subscribe to the uniform on the right principle
of transfers, and non-deprivation domination.
Theorem 4.1. Let x,y ∈ Yn(D). The following four statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a ﬁnite sequence of increments and/or uniform on the
right progressive transfers.
(b) W(x) ≥ W(y), for all W ∈ W ∗.
(b2) Wf(x) ≥ Wf(y), for all f ∈ F ∗.
(c) x ≥ND y.
Proof. Letting qi := (n − i + 1)/n, for all i = 1,2,...,n, the extended Gini social welfare
function can be rewritten as
(4.19) Wf(x) = x1 +
n X
i=2
f (qi) [xi − xi−1].
13Imposing the further restriction that the weighting function is continuous over [0,1) it can be proven that
star-shapedness is also a necessary condition by making use of a replication argument. However, in this
case we can no longer restrict our attention to distributions of ﬁxed dimension and we have to allow the
population to vary.
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qi [xi − xi−1].































































(a) =⇒ (b). This follows directly from the deﬁnition of the class W ∗ of social welfare functions.
(b) =⇒ (b2). It is a consequence of the fact that Wf ∈ W ∗ whenever f ∈ F ∗.
(b2) =⇒ (c). Suppose that statement (b2) holds, which upon using (4.22), is equivalent to:
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n − k + 1
n
< q ≤ 1,
where k = 2,3,...,n − 1. One can easily check that f(k) ∈ F ∗, for k = 1,2,...,n. Upon
substitution into (4.23), we obtain












≥ 0, ∀ k = 1,2,...,n,
from which we conclude that x ≥ND y.
(c) =⇒ (a). Suppose that x ≥ND y in which case there are two possibilities.













, ∀k = 1,2,...,n − 1,
and we deduce from Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006, Theorem 2) that distribution x can be
obtained from distribution y by means of a ﬁnite sequence of uniform on the right progressive
transfers.
Case 2: µ(x) > µ(y). Consider the distribution z := (z1,...,zn) such that zi = yi, for all
i = 1,2,...,n−1, and zn = yn+n[µ(x)−µ(y)]. Distribution z is obtained from distribution y
by means of a single increment, hence z ≥RO y and thus z ≥ND y by application of Proposition

































hence x ≥ND z and µ(z) = µ(x). We are back to the previous case and we conclude that
distribution x can be derived from distribution z by means of a ﬁnite sequence of uniform on
the right progressive transfers.
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According to Theorem 4.1, if the non-deprivation curves of the distributions under compar-
ison do not intersect, then there is no room for disagreement among ethical observers provided
they subscribe to MON and URPT. More precisely, the distribution whose non-deprivation
curve is located above that of the other distribution will be socially preferred from a wel-
fare point of view. Requiring unanimity of value judgements over the subset of those ethical
observers who make comparisons on the basis of the extended Gini social welfare function
does not make a diﬀerence. The only restriction then will be that the weighting function,
which captures the ethical observer’s attitude towards inequality, must be star-shaped. A
contrario, if the non-deprivation curves associated with two distributions intersect, then it
is always possible to ﬁnd two social welfare functions in the class W ∗ – and therefore two
star-shaped weighting functions – that will rank these distributions in the opposite way. More
importantly, Theorem 4.1 identiﬁes the equalizing process that leads to dominance according
to the non-deprivation quasi-ordering. If one distribution is ranked higher than another by
the non-deprivation quasi-ordering, then it is always possible to obtain the dominating distri-
bution from the dominated one by successive applications of uniform on the right progressive
transfers and/or increments.
The non-deprivation quasi-ordering does not exhaust all the possibilities for checking
whether one distribution will be judged as better than another distribution by all social wel-
fare functions in the class W ∗. Chakravarty (1997) has already noted that the comparisons
of the means of the censored distributions provide an alternative and equivalent test. Indeed,











, ∀ k = 1,2,...,n.
We know from Proposition 4.1 that the non-deprivation quasi-ordering is more incomplete
than the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering, which actually means that the former criterion

















[xk − yk] ≥ 0, ∀ k = 1,2,...,n,
which indicates what is needed in addition to generalised Lorenz dominance for a distribution
to be ranked above another by the non-deprivation quasi-ordering. Non-deprivation dominance
necessitates that the vertical distance at any p = k/n between the generalised Lorenz curves
of the distributions under comparison be greater than a minimal value as the following result
indicates:























for all k = 1,2,...,n.
Proof. In the light of (4.30), one can immediately check that condition (4.31) implies that










































































which, upon invoking Proposition 4.1 implies that ¬[x ≥ND y], which makes the proof com-
plete.
4.2. The Measurement of Inequality
It is typically assumed when making welfare comparisons that eﬃciency and equity consid-
erations must be accounted for. An implication of the way such considerations are incorpo-
rated in most welfare criteria is that eﬃciency is given a primer as compared to equity. The
non-deprivation quasi-ordering is no exception: it always ranks a distribution above another
distribution if the former is obtained from the latter by means of an increment. Eﬃciency
considerations are eliminated in inequality measurement where the focus of interest is on the
way income is distributed among the individuals. We are interested in the implications for in-
equality measurement of requiring that inequality does not increase as the result of a uniform
on the right progressive transfer and we denote as I ∗ the set of ethical inequality indices that
satisfy URPT. The extended Gini social evaluation function Ξf inherits all the properties of
the extended Gini social welfare function: in particular, it satisﬁes URPT if and only if the
weighting function f is star-shaped. A direct consequence is that star-shapedness of f is also
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for IR
f and IA
f to fulﬁl URPT.
The non-deprivation curve can be easily adapted in order to capture the relative inequality
dimension of the distribution. The relative non-deprivation curve of distribution x ∈ Yn(D)
with D ⊆ R++ is deﬁned by RND(p;x) := ND(p;ˆ x), for all p ∈ [0,1]. Hence the relative non-
deprivation curve is nothing else than the non-deprivation curve of the reduced distribution.
Definition 4.4. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D) with D ⊆ R++, we will say













, ∀k = 1,2,...,(n − 1).
The following result, which establishes the connections between relative non-deprivation dom-
inance, uniform on the right progressive transfers and scale transformations, and the require-
ment of unanimity among the ethical observers – in particular those of the extended Gini type
– who subscribe to URPT and SI, follows from Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.2. Let x,y ∈ Yn(D) with D ⊆ R++. The following four statements are equiva-
lent:
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(a) x is obtained from y by means of a scale transformation and/or a ﬁnite sequence of
uniform on the right progressive transfers.
(b) IR(x) ≤ IR(y), for all IR ∈ I ∗ ∩ I R.
(b2) IR
f (x) ≤ IR
f (y), for all f ∈ F ∗.
(c) x ≥RND y.
Proof.
(a) =⇒ (b). Suppose ﬁrst that x = λy for some λ > 0. Then, we have µ(x) = µ(λy) = λµ(y)
and Ξf(x) = Ξf(λy) = λΞf(y), which follows from the fact that the mean and the equally
distributed equivalent income of the extended Gini social welfare function are homogenous of
degree one. Upon substitution into the deﬁnition of IR, we obtain
(4.36) I








Next, if x is obtained from y by means of a single uniform on the right transfer, then µ(x) =
µ(y) and W(x) ≥ W(y). Using (2.4) this implies that
(4.37) I








The result generalises to an arbitrary sequence of uniform on the right progressive transfers
by transitivity.
(b) =⇒ (b2). It is a consequence of the fact that IR
f ∈ I ∗ ∩ I R whenever f ∈ F ∗.



















for all f ∈ F ∗. Since µ(ˆ x) = µ(ˆ y) = 1, condition (4.38) is equivalent to Ξf(ˆ x) ≥ Ξf(ˆ y).


























Consider the weighting functions f(k) ∈ F ∗ used in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Upon substi-
tution into (4.39), we obtain












= Wf(k)(ˆ y), ∀ k = 1,2,...,(n − 1),
from which we conclude that x ≥RND y.
(c) =⇒ (a). Suppose that x ≥RND y, in which case there are three possibilities. If µ(x) = µ(y),
then this is equivalent to x ≥ND y and it follows from Theorem 4.1 that x can be obtained from
y by means of a ﬁnite sequence of uniform on the right progressive transfers. If µ(x) > µ(y),
then choose λ = µ(x)/µ(y) > 1. We have x ≥ND λy ∼RND y and x is obtained from
y by means of a ﬁnite sequence of uniform on the right progressive transfers and a scale
transformation. Finally if µ(x) < µ(y), then we choose λ = µ(y)/µ(x) > 1 and we have
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x ∼RND λx ≥ND y. Again x is obtained from y by means of one scale transformation and a
ﬁnite sequence of uniform on the right progressive transfers.
Turning next our attention to absolute inequality we deﬁne the absolute non-deprivation
curve of distribution x ∈ Yn(D) by AND(p;x) := ND(p;˜ x), for all p ∈ [0,1]. The absolute
non-deprivation curve obtains by application of the non-deprivation curve to the centered
distribution.
Definition 4.5. Given two income distributions x,y ∈ Yn(D), we will say that x absolute













, ∀k = 1,2,...,(n − 1).
The following result constitutes the counterpart of Theorem 4.2 when one is interested in
absolute inequality.
Theorem 4.3. Let x,y ∈ Yn(D). The following four statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a translation transformation and/or a ﬁnite sequence
of uniform on the right progressive transfers.
(b) IA(x) ≤ IA(y), for all IA ∈ I ∗ ∩ I A.
(b2) IA
f (x) ≤ IA
f (y), for all f ∈ F ∗.
(c) x ≥AND y.
Proof.
(a) =⇒ (b2). Suppose ﬁrst that x = y + γ1 for some γ ∈ R, where 1 := (1,...,1). Then we
have µ(x) = µ(y + γ1) = µ(y) + γ and Ξf(x) = Ξf(y + γ1) = Ξf(y) + γ, which follows from
the fact that the mean and the equally distributed equivalent income of the extended Gini
social welfare function are translatable of degree one. Upon substitution into the deﬁnition of
IA, we obtain that
(4.42) I
A(x) = µ(y) + γ − Ξf(y) − γ = µ(y + γ1) − Ξf(y + γ1) = I
A(y + γ1).
Next if x is obtained from y by means of a single uniform on the right progressive transfer,
then µ(x) = µ(y) and W(x) ≥ W(y). Appealing to (2.5) this implies that:
(4.43) I
A(x) = µ(x) − Ξf(x) ≤ µ(y) − Ξf(y) = I
A(y).
The result generalises to an arbitrary sequence of uniform on the right progressive transfers
by transitivity.
(b) =⇒ (b2). It is a consequence of the fact that IA
f ∈ I ∗ ∩ I A whenever f ∈ F ∗.




f (x) = µ(x) − Ξf(x) = µ(˜ x) − Ξf(˜ x) ≤ µ(˜ y) − Ξf(˜ y) = µ(y) − Ξf(y) = I
A
f (y),
for all f ∈ F ∗. Since µ(˜ x) = µ(˜ y) = 0, condition (4.44) is equivalent to Ξf(˜ x) ≥ Ξf(˜ y).
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Consider the weighting functions f(k) ∈ F ∗ used in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Upon substi-
tution into (4.45), we obtain












= Wf(k)(˜ y), ∀ k = 1,2,...,(n − 1),
from which we conclude that x ≥AND y.
(c) =⇒ (a). Suppose that x ≥AND y, in which case there are three possibilities. If µ(x) = µ(y),
then this is equivalent to x ≥ND y and it follows from Theorem 4.1 that x can be obtained from
y by means of a ﬁnite sequence of uniform on the right progressive transfers. If µ(x) > µ(y),
then choose γ = µ(x) − µ(y) > 0. We have x ≥ND y + γ1 ∼AND y and x is obtained from
y by means of a ﬁnite sequence uniform on the right progressive transfers and a translation
transformation. Finally if µ(x) < µ(y), then we choose γ = µ(y) − µ(x) > 0 and we have
x ∼AND x+γ1 ≥ND y. Again x is obtained from y by means of one translation transformation
and a ﬁnite sequence of uniform on the right progressive transfers.
We note that no further restriction in addition to star-shapedness is needed for the relative
(resp. absolute) inequality indices inherited from the extended Gini social welfare function
to be consistent with the relative (resp. absolute) non-deprivation quasi-ordering.14 Because
URPT is a weaker condition than the usual PT, there is a high presumption that the relative
and absolute non-deprivation quasi-orderings will provide far more incomplete rankings than
the ones generated by the relative and absolute Lorenz quasi-orderings. As we will see later
on the application of our criteria to the comparison of a range of countries conﬁrms this
conjecture.
5. Discussion of Related Results in the Literature
An examination of the literature suggests that our approach and results overlap to a cer-
tain degree with already published work mainly by Chakravarty (1997) on the one hand and
Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006) on the other hand. We certainly do not claim for originality
but we would like to point at a number of diﬀerences with these existing works and clar-
ify some points. An alternative approach for measuring deprivation has been proposed by
Yitzhaki (1979) and subsequently reﬁned by Hey and Lambert (1980). We devote some space
to a discussion of their approach emphasizing the main diﬀerences with ours.
As we mentioned above what we call the non-deprivation curve in this paper has already
been known for some time in the literature as the generalised satisfaction curve introduced
by Chakravarty (1997). However, starting from its deﬁnition, it is not completely clear what
the generalised satisfaction curve looks like. In particular, examination of Chakravarty et al.
(1995, Figure 1) suggests that the satisfaction curve is continuously increasing over the interval
[0,1], while our deﬁnition of the non-deprivation curve insists that it is a stepwise function
with a ﬁnite number of discontinuities. Actually, the non-deprivation curve is a modiﬁed ver-
sion of the quantile curve, where the ﬁrst diﬀerences in incomes are given diﬀerent weights,
which are decreasing at a constant rate with the individuals’ ranks. From a practical point of
view, the interpolation introduced implicitly by Chakravarty et al. (1995) in their deﬁnition
of the generalised satisfaction curve does not pose a problem as long as one is interested in the
14This may be contrasted with the utilitarian framework where the consistency of the relative and absolute
inequality indices with relative and absolute Lorenz dominance implies restrictions on the utility function
that go far beyond concavity (see e.g. Ebert (1988)).
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comparisons of distributions for populations of ﬁxed size. Things happen to be very diﬀerent
when the populations involved have diﬀerent sizes, in which case Chakravarty (1997)’s gener-
alised satisfaction criterion and our non-deprivation criterion may lead to diﬀerent rankings
of the distributions under comparison.
Up to the restriction that the distributions have the same means, our Theorem 4.1 looks
at ﬁrst sight quite similar to Theorem 3 in Chakravarty (1997). However, there is a major
diﬀerence that concerns the procedure used in order to convert the dominated distribution into
the dominating one: a fair transformation in Chakravarty (1997) and a sequence of uniform
on the right progressive transfers in our case. Following Chakravarty (1997), we will say that
distribution x is obtained from distribution y by means of a fair transformation if there exists






uj, ∀k = 1,2,...,n − 1.
Using the fact that u = x − y and upon substitution, condition (5.1) reduces to





[xj − yj], ∀k = 1,2,...,n − 1,













, ∀k = 1,2,...,n − 1,
hence x ≥ADP y. Invoking (4.3), we obtain that this is equivalent to x ≥ND y when µ(x) =
µ(y). To conclude: requiring that distribution x is obtained from distribution y by means of
a fair transformation is but a diﬀerent way of imposing that x ≥ND y. Therefore, the notion
of a fair transformation adds little to our understanding of the implicit equalising process that
leads to non-deprivation dominance. Although a uniform on the right progressive transfer is
admittedly a more complex operation than a progressive transfer, it is far more elementary
than a fair transformation. For this reason it is believed to be more informative than a
fair transformation, making it easier to comprehend what is precisely meant by inequality
reduction.
To contrast our results with those of Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006), we start with the def-
inition of the extended Gini social welfare function given in (2.7). Letting qi := (n − i + 1)/n,
for all i = 1,2,...,n, and upon straightforward manipulation, we obtain
















where we have made use of the fact that ADP(1;x) = 0 (for details see Chateauneuf and
Moyes (2006)). If the weighting function f is star-shaped, then it is suﬃcient for welfare to
improve that mean income increases and that the absolute deprivation curve moves downwards.
This suggests a two-stage procedure for evaluating income distributions: ﬁrst, the absolute
deprivation curves of the distributions are compared and, if they do not cross, then the means
are computed in a second stage. The distribution that comes with the higher mean and
the lower absolute deprivation curve is considered better from a social welfare point of view.
Formally this criterion can be written as:












, ∀ k = 1,2,...,(n − 1).
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This is reminiscent of the procedure based on the comparisons of the relative Lorenz curves
and mean incomes that constituted the starting point of Shorrocks (1983). The problem with
this way of proceeding – as Shorrocks (1983) emphasized – is that the distribution with the
higher Lorenz curve has also generally the lowest mean, which makes the conclusion of this
two-stage evaluation process ambiguous. A similar observation can be made here even though
it remains to be investigated whether the distributions with higher means are also those where
the feelings of deprivation are the more exacerbated among the population. Then the fact that
two distributions do not pass the test described by (5.5) does not preclude the possibility that
one distribution be ranked above the other one by all social welfare functions in the class
W ∗. Obviously, if Wf(x) ≥ Wf(y), for all f ∈ F ∗, then µ(x) ≥ µ(y). But it may well be
case that the absolute deprivation curves of x and y intersect – or what is even worse that
the absolute deprivation curve of x is everywhere above that of y – making it impossible
to rank distributions x and y. Consider for instance the distributions x = (1,4,5,8) and
y = (1,2,6,7), and note that x and y cannot be ordered by the rank order criterion. One
can easily verify that the absolute deprivation curves of distributions x and y intersect while
µ(x) > µ(y), making it impossible to conclude whether x will be ranked above y or not by all
ethical observers who subscribe to URPT and MON. However, the non-deprivation curve of
x is everywhere located above that of y, and Theorem 4.1 conﬁrms that W(x) ≥ W(y), for
all W ∈ W ∗.15
Finally we would like to contrast our approach with the alternative method proposed
by Yitzhaki (1979) and further developed by Hey and Lambert (1980) for measuring overall
deprivation in the society. The concepts of individual deprivation referred to in the two above
papers and in ours are identical: an individual’s deprivation is associated with the aggregate
gap between her income and those of the individuals richer than her, up to a scale factor equal
to the population size. It follows that the measures of individual non-deprivation give the
same value for a given individual even though, in Yitzhaki (1979) an individual is associated
with her income, while in our case she is identiﬁed by her relative position on the income
scale. However, these two approaches diﬀer in the way the individuals’ deprivation levels are
aggregated over the population in order to derive the overall deprivation in the society. While
Hey and Lambert (1980) compare the individual non-deprivation proﬁles at each income level,
we make this comparison for individuals located at the same position on the income scale.
Under the condition that the distributions under comparison have equal means, Hey and











(z − yi), ∀ z ∈ R,
where m(z;x) and m(z;y) represent the number of individuals with an income no greater than
z in situations x and y, respectively. In other words, poverty in situation x must not exceed
15Actually Chakravarty (1997, Theorem 9) has identiﬁed the class of social welfare functions with the prop-
erty that, if distribution x is unanimously preferred to distribution y, then condition (5.5) will be met, and
conversely. Monotonicity has to be replaced by the weaker requirement of incremental improvement accord-
ing to which welfare increases as the result of equal additions to all incomes (see Kolm (1976), Shorrocks
(1983)). This equivalence does not hold when one restricts attention to the extended Gini social welfare
functions even though by deﬁnition they satisfy the incremental improvement condition. Indeed, we know
from Theorem 4.1 that the ranking of distributions generated by unanimous agreement among all extended
Gini ethical observers subscribing to MON and URPT proves to be identical to that implied by the non-
deprivation criterion. However, non-deprivation domination of one distribution by another is compatible
with the fact that their absolute deprivation curves cross, as distributions x and y above illustrate.
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poverty in situation y for all possible poverty lines z, which appealing to Foster and Shorrocks
(1988, Theorem 2) is equivalent to x ≥GL y. Proposition 4.1 makes clear that our approach is
less decisive than that of Hey and Lambert (1980) because non-deprivation dominance implies
generalised Lorenz dominance but not the converse. On the other hand it is based on value
judgements that might be considered less controversial than the ones implicitly adopted by
Hey and Lambert (1980).
6. Welfare and Inequality Comparisons Across 17 Countries
The generalised Lorenz and the non-deprivation quasi-orderings capture diﬀerent features of
the distributions under comparison. On the other hand, Proposition 4.1 indicates that non-
deprivation dominance implies generalised Lorenz dominance. It is then natural to question
how far away the ranking generated by the non-deprivation criterion will be from that implied
by the application of the generalised Lorenz test. Similar questions arise for the relative and
absolute non-deprivation criteria as compared with the relative and absolute Lorenz ones. In
order to contrast the rankings of distributions our new criteria generate with those obtained in
the traditional framework, we have chosen to measure well-being and inequality in 17 countries
using income data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).
Table 6.1: The Countries Under Comparison
No Country Year DHI per Capita Sample Size
1 Mexico 2000 5 788.32 10 072
2 Poland 1999 6 330.86 30 812
3 Hungary 1999 6 513.81 1 927
4 Greece 2000 13 598.82 3 873
5 Spain 2000 17 627.86 4 761
6 Finland 2000 18 152,60 10 419
7 Sweden 2000 18 356.47 14 471
8 Netherlands 1999 19 249.84 4 331
9 Germany 2000 20 123.77 10 982
10 United Kingdom 1999 20 733.02 24 830
11 Austria 2000 20 945.18 2 329
12 Belgium 2000 21 177.11 2 080
13 Canada 2000 23 583.00 28 902
14 Norway 2000 24 603.77 12 870
15 Switzerland 2000 25 825.90 3 627
16 USA 2000 29 028.81 49 294
17 Luxembourg 2000 29 504.36 2 415
For each household, the LIS database indicates the disposable household income (DHI),
that is its total income after taxation and transfer payments, and the household type de-
termined by its composition and size. Incomes are provided in local currencies in order to
facilitate comparisons within a country over time. These ﬁgures have been converted using
the purchasing power parities (PPP) proposed by the OECD in order to make them compa-
rable across countries. To take family needs into account we have chosen to adjust household
incomes by means of equivalence scales. Although we are aware that there are good reasons
that militate for the avoidance of this method of adjustment, we have adopted this procedure
for simplicity to the extent that this exercise is purely illustrative. Taking the single adult as
the reference type, the household’s equivalent income is obtained by deﬂating the household’s
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total income by the OECD equivalence scale equal to an isoelastic transformation of family
size. More precisely, the equivalent income of a household with income y and size m is given
by E(y;m) = y/mρ, for all m ≥ 1 and all y ∈ D, where ρ ∈ [0,1] is the scale elasticity.
When ρ = 0, no adjustment is made for family needs and the household’s equivalent income is
equal to household’s income. When ρ = 1, the household’s equivalent income is equal to per
capita income. In general one chooses an intermediate value of the scale elasticity and we have
followed this practice by setting ρ = .5 as it is done for instance in Atkinson, Rainwater, and
Smeeding (1995). Table 6.1 gives the list of countries we have retained and indicates for each
of these the year when the data were collected, the corresponding adjusted DHIs per capita,
and the number of households in the samples.
Table 6.2: Ranking of Countries by the Rank Order Criterion (IU)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico # # # 0 0 0 # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Poland # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 Hungary # # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 Greece # 0 0 # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 # 0
5 Spain # # # # 0 # # 0 0 0 # 0
6 Finland # # # # # # # # # # 0
7 Sweden # # # # # # 0 0 # 0
8 Netherlands # # # # # # # # 0
9 Germany # # # # 0 0 # 0
10 United Kingdom # # # # 0 # #
11 Austria # # # 0 # 0
12 Belgium # # # # #
13 Canada # 0 # #
14 Norway # # #
15 Switzerland # #
16 USA #
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
For each country, the individuals’ equivalent incomes are aggregated in centiles, where
each of these is assigned the average income of the individuals belonging to it. It would have
been possible to adopt alternative groupings, for instance deciles as in Atkinson et al. (1995).
While this way of proceeding is computationally less time consuming, it results in an artiﬁ-
cial smoothing of the distribution of incomes and may cause a substantial loss of information
about the shape of the distributions. On the contrary, it is expected that the division of
the population into centiles is suﬃciently detailed to preserve most on the information con-
tained in the LIS database. As we have seen, our dominance criteria amount to comparing
particular modiﬁcations of the quantile curves of the distributions. It follows that each of
our criteria will require a ﬁnite number of comparisons to be made at each abscissa k/K, for
k = 1,2,...,K, where K = 100, for deciding whether one distribution dominates another
or not. In order to take into account the fact that the distributions under comparisons are
samples drawn from larger populations, we have implemented statistical inference using suc-
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Table 6.3: Ranking of Countries by the Generalised Lorenz Criterion (IU)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 Hungary # # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 Greece # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 # 0
5 Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 # 0
6 Finland # # # # # # # # # # 0
7 Sweden # # # 0 # # 0 0 # 0
8 Netherlands # # # # # # # # 0
9 Germany # # # # 0 0 # 0
10 United Kingdom # # # 0 0 # 0
11 Austria # # # 0 # 0
12 Belgium # # 0 # 0
13 Canada 0 0 # 0
14 Norway # # 0
15 Switzerland # 0
16 USA 0
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
cessively the intersection-union (IU) method advocated by Howes (1994) and Kaur, Prakasao,
and Singh (1994), and the union-intersection (UI) method introduced by Bishop and Formby
(1999).16 The general strategy consists in viewing the set of inequalities corresponding to a
domination relationship as a statistical hypothesis and it is described in Appendix A. In this
illustration we have performed both tests for each dominance criterion, at the 95% conﬁdence
level. In order to save space, we only present in the text the tables giving the results of
the pairwise comparisons obtained under the restrictive IU method for each criterion, and we
relegate to Appendix B the corresponding tables for the UI method. Substituting the more
liberal UI method for the IU one results in an appreciable gain in decisiveness, as it is shown
in Table 6.9, but it does not aﬀect the general conclusions drawn from the application of the
dominance criteria.
Considering the welfare ranking of countries we have applied successively the rank order,
the generalised Lorenz and the non-deprivation quasi-orderings to the distributions of adjusted
household incomes. The most striking result is the rather good performance of rank order
dominance, which allows us to rank conclusively 65 out of 136 pairs of countries hence a
success rate of 47.79%. We have indicated in Table 6.2 the results of the pairwise comparisons
according to rank order dominance. The 17 countries are listed in order of adjusted DHI
per capita ranging from the lowest (Mexico) to the highest (Luxembourg) ﬁgures. The table
allows us to distinguish two broad groups of countries, where the ﬁrst group consisting of
developed countries clearly dominates the second one composed of Mexico, Poland, Hungary
16Actually, most of the microdata sets provided by the member countries to the LIS are generally not randomly
drawn from the national populations. The potential biases in the representativeness of the national data
sets are corrected by means of the introduction of appropriate household weights.
28Magdalou and Moyes/Social Welfare, Inequality and Deprivation
Table 6.4: Ranking of Countries by the Non-Deprivation Criterion (IU)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Poland # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 Hungary # # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 Greece # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 # 0
5 Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 # 0
6 Finland # # # # # # # # # # 0
7 Sweden # # # # # # 0 0 # 0
8 Netherlands # # # # # # # # 0
9 Germany # # # # 0 0 # 0
10 United Kingdom # # # 0 0 # 0
11 Austria # # # 0 # 0
12 Belgium # # # # 0
13 Canada 0 0 # 0
14 Norway # # 0
15 Switzerland # 0
16 USA 0
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
and Greece. Application of generalised Lorenz dominance permits to reach deﬁnite conclusions
in 87 out of 136 cases, which gives a success rate of 63.97%. Our empirical ﬁndings conﬁrm
the theoretical result that the ranking generated by the generalised Lorenz criterion is ﬁner
than the one implied by the rank order criterion. What is perhaps surprising is the magnitude
of the increase in the success rate implied by the substitution of the generalised Lorenz for
rank order dominance: 16% of the success rate. The results of the pairwise comparisons of
countries on the basis of generalised Lorenz dominance are indicated in Table 6.3. Typically,
the ranking of countries by the generalised Lorenz criterion appears to be closely related to the
ordering one would get on the basis on per capita income. While the success rates we obtain
are quite satisfactory, they are far below those obtained for instance by Bishop, Formby, and
Thistle (1991). Applying the UI method these authors found that rank order dominance was
decisive in 75% of the cases, while the application of generalised Lorenz dominance led to
unambiguous rankings in 84% of the cases. Substituting the UI method for the IU one results
in signiﬁcant increases in our success rates more in line with those obtained by Bishop et al.
(1991): 61.76% for rank order dominance and 76.47% for generalised Lorenz dominance.
We know from Proposition 4.1 that the non-deprivation quasi-ordering is less powerful
than the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering since the latter is implied by the former. One
may therefore expect that the success rate of the non-deprivation criterion will fall below that
achieved by the generalised Lorenz criterion in practice. The results of the comparisons based
on the non-deprivation quasi-ordering are indicated in Table 6.4. The striking thing is that
the success rate of the non-deprivation quasi-ordering is comparable to the one attained by
the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering. Indeed, the non-deprivation quasi-ordering allows to
rank conclusively 84 out of 136 pairs of countries, which means that this criterion is decisive
29Magdalou and Moyes/Social Welfare, Inequality and Deprivation
Table 6.5: Ranking of Countries by the Relative Lorenz Criterion (IU)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 # 0 0 0 # 0
2 Poland # # # # # 0 # # 0 # # # # 1 0
3 Hungary # # # # # # 1 # # # # # 1 0
4 Greece # # # 0 # # 0 # # # # 1 0
5 Spain # # 0 0 # 0 # # # # 1 0
6 Finland # # # 1 # 1 1 # 1 1 #
7 Sweden # # 1 # # 1 # # 1 #
8 Netherlands # 1 # # 1 # # 1 #
9 Germany 1 # # 1 # # 1 0
10 United Kingdom # # # # 0 # 0
11 Austria # 1 # # 1 #
12 Belgium # # # # 0
13 Canada # 0 1 0
14 Norway # # #
15 Switzerland 1 0
16 USA 0
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
Table 6.6: Ranking of Countries by the Relative Non-Deprivation Criterion (IU)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 # 0 0 0 # 0
2 Poland # # # # # 0 # # 0 # # # # # 0
3 Hungary # # # # # # 1 # # # # # 1 0
4 Greece # # # 0 # # # # # # # 1 0
5 Spain # # 0 # # 0 # # # # # 0
6 Finland # # # 1 # 1 1 # 1 # #
7 Sweden # # 1 # # 1 # # # #
8 Netherlands # 1 # # 1 # # 1 #
9 Germany 1 # # 1 # # 1 #
10 United Kingdom # # # # 0 # 0
11 Austria # 1 # # 1 #
12 Belgium # # # # 0
13 Canada # # # 0
14 Norway # # #
15 Switzerland # 0
16 USA 0
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
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in 61.76% of the cases. Contrary to what one might have anticipated, the substitution of the
non-deprivation quasi-ordering for the generalised Lorenz one does not result in a signiﬁcant
decrease in the number of pairs of countries that can be ranked. Invoking again Proposi-
tion 4.1, this means that the rankings of countries provided by the generalised Lorenz and
the non-deprivation quasi-orderings are almost identical, something that can be checked by
comparing Tables 6.3 and 6.4. Actually, the only diﬀerence concerns three pairs of countries
that are ordered by the generalised Lorenz criterion while they are not comparable under
the non-deprivation criterion: Poland and Hungary, Sweden and Austria, and Belgium and
Switzerland. As it is expected, the non-deprivation quasi-ordering performs better when the
more liberal UI method is used instead of the IU method. In this case one obtains a con-
clusive verdict in 101 out of 136 possible pairs of countries, hence a success rate of 74.26%
to be contrasted with the 61.76% score attained under the IU method. But here again the
substitution of the generalised Lorenz criterion for the non-deprivation one does not result
in a substantial gain in decisiveness. There are only three pairs of countries for which the
generalised Lorenz criterion is decisive under the UI method while the non-deprivation is not:
Sweden and Germany, Netherlands and Austria, Germany and Belgium. However, while the
gain in decisiveness under both inference methods are identical, we note that the pairs of
countries concerned are distinct. To sum up, in the case of the distributions examined here,
a switch from the usual generalised Lorenz criterion – or equivalently second degree stochas-
tic dominance – to the non-deprivation criterion does not result in a dramatic change in the
picture of the distribution of well-being across countries. But the non-deprivation criterion
tells us much more about the equalising process that leads to generalised Lorenz dominance.
It indicates the nature of the equalising transformations that were needed in addition to in-
crements for deriving the dominating distribution from the dominated one. Actually, these
transformations are not arbitrary progressive transfers – as the rankings of the countries by
the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering might have suggested – but uniform on the right pro-
gressive transfers.17 Although it is certainly premature to generalise, this example provides a
response to a serious objection that could be made against the non-deprivation criteria: its
lower degree of decisiveness as compared with the generalised Lorenz criterion.
The application of the standard Lorenz tests and of the non-deprivation based criteria to
the comparisons of inequality results in more contrasted pictures. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 indicate
the results of the pairwise comparisons of countries on the basis of the relative Lorenz and
of the relative non-deprivation quasi-orderings. Similarly, the rankings of countries generated
by the absolute Lorenz and by the absolute non-deprivation quasi-orderings are summarized
in Tables 6.7 and 6.8, respectively. A ﬁrst remark is that, on the whole, the inequality quasi-
orderings are far less discriminatory than the corresponding welfare quasi-orderings. This
originates in part in the fact that the size eﬀect due to diﬀerences in disposable per capita
income, which explains much of the rankings of countries obtained on the basis of the welfare
criteria, is eliminated by means of the normalisation procedures implicit in the deﬁnition of
our inequality criteria. Now it is the way the aggregate adjusted income is split between the
households that plays a role in the determination of the rankings of the distributions. A second
remark is that the inequality quasi-orderings rooted in the notion of non-deprivation are less
powerful than those derived from the generalised Lorenz curve, something which is more in
17We know from the proof of Theorem 4.1 that, if country i non-deprivation dominates country j, then the
distribution of income in country i can be obtained from that of country j by (i) giving an additional income
to the richest individual in country j that makes the mean incomes of the countries equal, and (ii) performing
a ﬁnite number of uniform on the right progressive transfers.
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Table 6.7: Ranking of Countries by the Absolute Lorenz Criterion (IU)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico # # # 1 1 1 # 1 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Poland # 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 Greece 1 # # # 1 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 Spain # # # # 1 # # 1 1 1 1 #
6 Finland # # # 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 Sweden # 1 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 Germany 1 # # 1 1 1 1 1
10 United Kingdom # # # # # 1 #
11 Austria # 1 1 1 1 1
12 Belgium # # # # #
13 Canada # # 1 #
14 Norway # 1 #
15 Switzerland 1 #
16 USA 0
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
Table 6.8: Ranking of Countries by the Absolute Non-Deprivation Criterion (IU)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico # # # 1 1 # # 1 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Poland # 1 1 1 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 Greece 1 # # # 1 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 Spain # # # # 1 # # 1 # 1 1 #
6 Finland # # # 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 #
7 Sweden # # 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 #
8 Netherlands 1 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 Germany 1 # # 1 1 1 1 #
10 United Kingdom # # # # # # #
11 Austria # 1 1 1 1 1
12 Belgium # # # # #
13 Canada # # 1 #
14 Norway # # #
15 Switzerland # #
16 USA 0
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
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line with what one would expect. Indeed, as we have already insisted, the non-deprivation
inequality criteria impose restrictions on the way progressive transfers are combined and this
results in more demanding conditions to be met for obtaining dominance. This is particularly
the case for relative inequality where the non-deprivation approach permits only to rank 46
pairs of countries out of 136, while the relative Lorenz quasi-ordering is able to establish a
conclusive verdict in 56 cases. As a consequence the success rate falls from 41.18% to 33.82%
when the relative non-deprivation quasi-ordering is substituted for the relative Lorenz quasi-
ordering. A similar situation obtains in the case of absolute inequality: application of the
absolute Lorenz criterion allows to rank 93 pairs of countries (68.38% of the cases), while this
ﬁgure falls only to 82 (60.29% of the cases) when one appeals to the absolute non-deprivation
quasi-ordering. Applying the less conservative UI method rather than the IU method results
in a substantial increase of the success rates for relative inequality, which move up to 63.24%
for the relative non-deprivation quasi-ordering and to 74.26% for the relative Lorenz quasi-
ordering. We also witness increases in the success rates for absolute inequality though these
are less marked: 78.68% for the absolute non-deprivation quasi-ordering and 86.03% for the
absolute Lorenz quasi-ordering. A third remark is that more pairs of countries can be ranked
when one considers the absolute criteria rather than the relative ones, something which is
consistent with related ﬁndings in the literature. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 suggest that the absolute
inequality rankings of countries are close to the ordering one would get if the countries were
ranked in decreasing order of per capita income.18
Table 6.9: Success Rates of the Welfare and Inequality Quasi-Orderings
Social Welfare Inequality
RO ND GL RND RL AND AL
IU Test
Nb 65 84 87 46 56 82 93
(%) (47.79) (61.76) (63.97) (33.82) (41.18) (60.29) (68.38)
UI Test
Nb 84 101 104 86 101 107 117
(%) (61.76) (74.26) (76.47) (63.24) (74.26) (78.68) (86.03)
Finally, let us come back to the two-stage procedure originating in Chateauneuf and Moyes
(2006) that consists in declaring that one distribution generates higher welfare than another
distribution if it has a higher mean and a lower absolute deprivation curve. Under the con-
servative IU method, this procedure succeeds in being decisive in only one case: Luxembourg
and the USA, the former dominating the latter! This particularly bad score does not come
as a surprise given the almost perfect inverse correlation that exists between the ordering of
countries on the basis of mean income and the ranking obtained by resorting to the absolute
deprivation criterion as Table 6.8 makes clear. When the less conservative UI method is sub-
stituted for the IU method, this procedure produces conclusive verdicts in 8 additional cases
(namely, Mexico and Hungary, Poland and Hungary, Spain and Finland, Spain and Sweden,
Spain and the Netherlands, Sweden and the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, United King-
dom and Austria), which amounts to a success rate of slightly less than 7%. Contrasting these
ﬁgures with those obtained when the non-deprivation criterion is used – whatever the statis-
tical inference method – gives an idea of the ineﬃciency of this procedure for approximating
18This is a mechanical consequence of the very deﬁnition of the absolute measures, where the mean is sub-
tracted from each individual income, and of the fact that we have listed countries in increasing order of
average equivalent household disposable income.
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the ranking of countries implied by unanimous agreement among all ethical observers who
subscribe to the MON and URPT.
7. Concluding Comments
Building on Chakravarty (1997) and Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006), we have proposed in
this paper a method for making welfare and inequality comparisons based on the absence
of deprivation. This method constitutes a natural alternative to the standard approach in
normative economics, which consists in comparing the – generalised, relative and absolute –
Lorenz curves of the distributions. The Lorenz criteria are all consistent with the principle
of transfers, which requires that inequality decreases and welfare increases as the result of
an arbitrary progressive transfer. The criteria we propose actually obey a weaker version
of the principle of transfers: inequality decreases only for some speciﬁc combinations of the
progressive transfers, where the positions of the donor(s) and the beneﬁciary of the transfer
play a crucial role. Furthermore these criteria are related to the notion of deprivation that
arises from the comparison for each individual of her situation with those of the individuals
she considers as better-oﬀ.
Contrary to what might have been expected, preliminary empirical investigations sug-
gest that the non-deprivation criterion performs rather well as compared with the generalised
Lorenz criterion. Although it is premature to generalise at this stage, this result is neverthe-
less worth noting given the general skepticism one may face when proposing criteria ethically
more demanding than the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering. Things are more contrasted as
far as inequality comparisons are concerned, but still there the non-deprivation based inequal-
ity quasi-orderings do not perform too badly by comparison with the standard relative and
absolute Lorenz criteria. The application of the non-deprivation quasi-ordering may provide
additional information about the nature of the equalising process that leads to the domination
of a distribution by another. This is indisputable when the substitution of the non-deprivation
quasi-ordering for the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering does not aﬀect the ranking of the dis-
tributions. For in this case, we get additional information concerning the structure of the
modiﬁcations of the distributions that give rise to generalised Lorenz domination: these must
be uniform on the right progressive transfers.
The criteria we have proposed do only generate partial rankings of the situations under
comparison. While this might be considered satisfactory in some cases – for instance for the
design of tax reforms – it generally provides insuﬃcient grounds for making decisions. These
criteria must therefore be considered a ﬁrst round approach, which should be supplemented
by the use of particular indices in the general classes we have identiﬁed. An avenue for future
research would be to characterise by means of additional conditions particular social welfare
functions and inequality indices among those that are consistent with the non-deprivation
quasi-ordering.
The approach developed in this paper was partly motivated by the observation that the
principle of transfers, which supports the generalised Lorenz criterion, does not achieve a
consensus among those individuals having taken part in the questionnaire studies. It would
therefore be interesting to check if the non-deprivation quasi-ordering rooted in the uniform
on the right principle of transfers is more favourably accepted by the individuals participating
in such studies (see Magdalou (2006) for a preliminary investigation).
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A. The Statistical Inference Methods
We are interested in the comparisons in terms of welfare and inequality of the income distri-
butions of 17 selected countries. The actual income distribution of country i is indicated by
Xi and it is not observable. Since we do not have access to the actual income distributions,
we will base our comparisons on the sample data provided by the Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS) database. For each country i and each household h, the LIS database reports the dis-
posable income yi
h and the number of persons mi
h in the sample. In order to correct for biases
in the representativeness of the national samples, the LIS assigns to each household a weight
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be the corresponding weight. We therefore apply the standard procedure which consists in
weighting the household income by the number of persons, but we acknowledge the fact that
there are other possibilities (see e.g. Ebert (1997)). The sample adjusted income distribution














, where ni is the sample





, which upon in-








the sample quantile mean income for country i, where k = 1,2,...,K


































for k = 1,2,...,K. Therefore, for each country i in the database we have an ordered list of









, where K = 100.
All our dominance criteria require that K inequalities be satisﬁed for one distribution to
be ranked above another one. More precisely, distribution X is ranked above distribution Y













≥ 0, ∀ k = 1,2,...,K,
where η ∈ {RO,ND,GL,RND,RL,AND,AL}. We appeal to two methods in order to
compare the distributions: the intersection-union (IU) method and the union-intersection (UI)





we consider in the paper. Let the statistic
(A.3) Tk =
b ηA




















is the sample estimate of ηi
k, and b ωi
kk is the sample estimate of
the variance of ηi
k. The covariance matrix b Ω = [b ωhk] of the estimates of the generalised Lorenz
curve of distribution X is deﬁned by










(b µh − b γh)(b µk − b γk) + (b µh − b γh)(b γk − b γh)
i
,
for h ≤ k and k = 1,2,...,K, where b µk = µk (x|w) is the estimate of the quantile mean,
b γk = γk (x|w) the estimate of the conditional mean, and b λ2
h = λ2
k (x|w) the estimate of the
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conditional variance of the ﬁrst k incomes in the sample (x|w) (see Beach and Davidson
(1983)). To implement the tests we only need the variance estimates










(b µk − b γk)
2i
.
In order to derive the corresponding variance estimates for the quantile curve and the non-
deprivation curve, we use the fact that both curves are linear transformations of the generalised





































the corresponding quantile and non-deprivation curves. Then, one can easily check that
RO(x|w)
T = M GL(x|w)
T and ND(x|w)
T = RGL(x|w)
T, where the K × K matri-
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It follows from Rao (1965, page 321), that the covariance matrices of the estimates for the
quantile curve and the non-deprivation curve are given by M b ΩM
T and R b ΩR
T, respectively,
from which we derive the variance of the estimates. Appropriate normalisations of the sample
distribution (x|w) permit to obtain the variances of the estimates for the relative and absolute
Lorenz curves and for the relative and absolute non-deprivation curves.
Given two distributions X and Y , the IU method involves the following two hypotheses:
H0(X,Y ): ∃k ∈ {1,2,...,K} | η(k/K;X) − η(k/K;Y ) < 0, and
H1(X,Y ): η(k/K;X) − η(k/K;Y ) ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ {1,2,...,K}.
We ﬁrst test H0(X,Y ) against H1(X,Y ): either we accept H1(X,Y ) in which case distribution
X weakly dominates distribution Y , or we reject H1(X,Y ) and we move to the second stage
where H1(Y,X) is tested against H0(Y,X). Then, either we accept H1(Y,X) and distribution
Y weakly dominates distribution X, or we reject H1(Y,X) and we conclude that distributions
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X and Y are non-comparable. The sequence of tests for the IU method is summarized in
Figure A.1. To sum up, given two countries A and B, the IU rule allows us to conclude that:
A weakly dominates B iﬀ + Zα < min{T1,...,TK}, (A.9a)
B weakly dominates A iﬀ max{T1,...,TK} < −Zα, (A.9b)
A and B are non-comparable otherwise, (A.9c)
where Zα is the critical value for a signiﬁcance level of α derived from Student’s t-distribution.
We note that this method does not allow for equivalence: either one country weakly dominates
the other one, or the two countries are non-comparable.
Figure A.1: Test Procedure Under the IU Method
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Given two distributions X and Y , the UI method involves the following two hypotheses:
H0(X,Y ): η (k/K;X) − η (k/K;Y ) = 0, ∀ k ∈ {1,2,...,K},
H1(X,Y ): ∃k ∈ {1,2,...,K} | η (k/K;Y ) − η (k/K;X) > 0,
and we note that ¬H0(X,Y ) = H1(X,Y ) ∨ H1(Y,X). In a ﬁrst step, we test H0(X,Y ) against
H1(X,Y ) and there are two possibilities. If we accept H0(X,Y ), then we test in a second
stage H0(Y,X) against H1(Y,X): either we accept H0(Y,X), in which case we conclude that
distributions X and Y are equivalent, or we accept H1(Y,X) and we conclude that distribution
Y strongly dominates distribution X. If in the ﬁrst step we accept H1(X,Y ), then we test
in a second stage H0(Y,X) against H1(Y,X): either we accept H0(Y,X), in which case we
conclude that distribution X strongly dominates distribution Y , or we accept H1(Y,X) and
we conclude that distributions X and Y are non-comparable. We have represented in Figure
A.2 the test procedure for the UI method.
To sum up, given two countries A and B, the UI rule allows us to conclude that:
A strongly dominates B iﬀ − Cα < min{T1,...,TK} and Cα < max{T1,...,TK}, (A.10a)
B strongly dominates A iﬀ min{T1,...,TK} < −Cα and max{T1,...,TK} < Cα, (A.10b)
A is equivalent to B iﬀ − Cα < min{T1,...,TK} and max{T1,...,TK} < Cα, (A.10c)
A and B are non-comparable otherwise, (A.10d)
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Figure A.2: Test Procedure Under the UI Method
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where Cα is the critical value for a signiﬁcance level of α determined from the Student Maxi-
mum Modulus (SMM) distribution provided by Stoline and Ury (1979).
Comparison of (A.9a) and (A.10a) makes clear that it is more diﬃcult with the IU method
to conclude that country A dominates country B than with the UI method. This results in
a substantial loss in the discriminatory power of the IU method as compared with the UI
method. This is particularly true in our illustration where the success rates attained under
the IU method fall on average 10 points below those obtained under the UI method (see Table
6.9). In addition, it must be noted that the IU method does not allow for the possibility that
two distributions be considered equivalent according to our welfare criteria.
B. Ranking of Countries under the Union-Intersection Rule
We present for completeness the tables giving the results of the pairwise comparisons obtained
under the UI method at the 95% conﬁdence level. While the substitution of the more liberal
UI method for the IU one results in an appreciable gain in decisiveness, it does not aﬀect the
general conclusions drawn from the application of the dominance criteria.
A curiosum is worth noting: Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3 indicate that Austria dominates Belgium
according to the rank order, the generalised Lorenz and the non-deprivation criteria under
the UI method while the former country has a lower mean than the latter. This comes
in contradiction with the theory according to which, if a distribution rank order dominates
another distribution, then it has also a higher mean. A possible explanation of this puzzle
might originate in the statistical inference method used for deciding when one distribution
dominates another. In the present case, we observe that the centile means for Austria are
always greater than those for Belgium with the exception of the ﬁrst three and last centiles
where the opposite situation occurs. It is the huge gap in the last centile – the centile mean
for Belgium is about three times that of Austria – that explains the fact that the mean
income of Belgium is greater than the mean income of Austria. Actually, application of the
UI method indicates that the ﬁrst, second, third and last centile means for Austria are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those for Belgium, while at the same time there is a centile mean
– distinct from these – for which Austria is signiﬁcantly better than Belgium. The fact that
the diﬀerence between the last centile means of Belgium and Austria are not found to be
statistically signiﬁcant is somewhat surprising given the extent of the means diﬀerence. By
deﬁnition, the test statistics deﬁned by (A.4) involves the conditional variances of the sample
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Table B.1: Ranking of Countries by the Rank Order Criterion (UI)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico # # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Poland # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Spain # # # 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Finland # # # # # # # # # # 0
7 Sweden # # # # 0 # 0 0 # 0
8 Netherlands # # # # # 0 0 # 0
9 Germany # # # # 0 0 # 0
10 United Kingdom # # # # 0 # #
11 Austria 1 # 0 0 # 0
12 Belgium # 0 0 # 0
13 Canada # 0 # #
14 Norway # # #
15 Switzerland # #
16 USA #
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
Table B.2: Ranking of Countries by the Generalised Lorenz Criterion (UI)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Finland # # # # # # # # # # 0
7 Sweden 0 0 # 0 0 # 0 0 # 0
8 Netherlands # # 0 # # 0 0 # 0
9 Germany # 0 0 # 0 0 # 0
10 United Kingdom 0 # # 0 0 # 0
11 Austria 1 # 0 0 # 0
12 Belgium # 0 0 # 0
13 Canada 0 0 # 0
14 Norway # # 0
15 Switzerland # 0
16 USA 0
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
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Table B.3: Ranking of Countries by the Non-Deprivation Criterion (UI)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Finland # # # # # # # # # # 0
7 Sweden 0 # # 0 0 # 0 0 # 0
8 Netherlands # # # # # 0 0 # 0
9 Germany # 0 # # 0 0 # 0
10 United Kingdom 0 # # 0 0 # 0
11 Austria 1 # 0 0 # 0
12 Belgium # 0 0 # 0
13 Canada 0 0 # 0
14 Norway # # 0
15 Switzerland # 0
16 USA 0
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
Table B.4: Ranking of Countries by the Relative Lorenz Criterion (UI)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 # 0
2 Poland 0 # # 0 0 0 0 # 0 0 # # 0 1 0
3 Hungary 1 1 0 # 0 # 1 0 t 1 # # 1 0
4 Greece t 0 0 0 0 # 0 0 # # # 1 0
5 Spain 0 0 0 0 # 0 0 0 # 0 1 0
6 Finland # # # 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 #
7 Sweden 0 # 1 0 1 1 # # 1 #
8 Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 #
9 Germany 1 0 t 1 # # 1 0
10 United Kingdom 0 0 # # 0 # 0
11 Austria 1 1 1 1 1 0
12 Belgium 1 0 t 1 0
13 Canada # 0 1 0
14 Norway # # #
15 Switzerland 1 0
16 USA 0
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
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Table B.5: Ranking of Countries by the Relative Non-Deprivation Criterion (UI)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 # 0
2 Poland 0 # # 0 0 0 0 # 0 0 # # 0 1 0
3 Hungary 1 1 # # 0 # 1 0 t 1 # # 1 0
4 Greece 0 # # 0 0 # 0 0 # # # 1 0
5 Spain 0 0 0 0 # 0 0 # # # 1 0
6 Finland # # # 1 # 1 1 # 1 # #
7 Sweden 0 # 1 # 1 1 # # # #
8 Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 #
9 Germany 1 0 # 1 # # 1 0
10 United Kingdom 0 0 # # 0 # 0
11 Austria 1 1 # 1 1 #
12 Belgium 1 0 0 1 0
13 Canada # # # 0
14 Norway # # #
15 Switzerland # 0
16 USA 0
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
Table B.6: Ranking of Countries by the Absolute Lorenz Criterion (UI)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico # 0 1 1 1 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Poland 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 Greece 1 1 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 Spain 0 0 0 # 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 Finland # # 1 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 Sweden 0 1 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 Germany 1 0 t 1 1 1 1 1
10 United Kingdom 0 t # # # 1 #
11 Austria t 1 1 1 1 1
12 Belgium 1 1 1 1 1
13 Canada # # 1 #
14 Norway # 1 #
15 Switzerland 1 #
16 USA 0
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
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Table B.7: Ranking of Countries by the Absolute Non-Deprivation Criterion (UI)
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico # 0 # 1 1 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Poland 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 Greece 1 # 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 Spain 0 0 0 # 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 Finland # # # 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 #
7 Sweden 0 # 1 # 1 1 1 1 1 #
8 Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 Germany 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 #
10 United Kingdom 0 t # # # # #
11 Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 Belgium 1 1 1 1 1
13 Canada # # 1 #
14 Norway # # #
15 Switzerland # #
16 USA 0
17 Luxembourg
“#” means that countries i and j are not comparable.
“1” means that country i dominates country j.
“0” means that country j dominates country i.
“t” means that countries i and j are equivalent.
distributions under comparison. It is therefore possible that the diﬀerence in the last centile
conditional variances of the distributions for Austria and Belgium is suﬃciently large to oﬀset
the diﬀerences in the corresponding mean incomes. To some extent that might be considered
a drawback of the UI statistical inference method as compared with the IU one.
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